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Abstract. Deep neural networks have been successful in diverse dis-
criminative classification tasks, although, they are poorly calibrated of-
ten assigning high probability to misclassified predictions. Potential con-
sequences could lead to trustworthiness and accountability of the mod-
els when deployed in real applications, where predictions are evaluated
based on their confidence scores. Existing solutions suggest the benefits
attained by combining deep neural networks and Bayesian inference to
quantify uncertainty over the models’ predictions for ambiguous data
points. In this work we propose to validate and test the efficacy of like-
lihood based models in the task of out of distribution detection (OoD).
Across different datasets and metrics we show that Bayesian deep learn-
ing models on certain occasions marginally outperform conventional neu-
ral networks and in the event of minimal overlap between in/out distri-
bution classes, even the best models exhibit a reduction in AUC scores
in detecting OoD data. Preliminary investigations indicate the poten-
tial inherent role of bias due to choices of initialisation, architecture or
activation functions. We hypothesise that the sensitivity of neural net-
works to unseen inputs could be a multi-factor phenomenon arising from
the different architectural design choices often amplified by the curse of
dimensionality. Furthermore, we perform a study to find the effect of
the adversarial noise resistance methods on in and out-of-distribution
performance, as well as also investigate adversarial noise robustness of
Bayesian deep learners.
Keywords: OoD detection, Bayesian deep learning, uncertainty quan-
tification, generalisation, anomalies, outliers
1 Introduction
Anomaly detection is concerned with the detection of unexpected events. The
goal is to effectively detect rare or novel patterns which neither comply to the
norm nor follow a specific trend present in the existing data distribution. The
task of anomaly detection is often described as open category classification (Liu
et al., 2018) and anomalies can be referred to as outliers, novelties, noise de-
viations, exceptions or out-of-distribution (OoD) examples depending on the
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context of the application (Shafaei et al., 2018). Anomaly detection raises sig-
nificant challenges among which some stem from the nature of generated data
arising from different sources e.g. multi-modality from different domains such
as manufacturing, industrial, health sectors etc. (Chalapathy and Chawla, 2019;
Hendrycks et al., 2018a; Choi et al., 2018).
Fig. 1: An example of the OoD detection problem. At each angle 0o ≤ θ ≤ 180o
we record the image classifier’s response. The classifier is able to predict the true
label, dog, with approximately 100% confidence for an angle θ ≤ 30o degrees,
while it fails to predict the correct label for any rotation angle θ > 30o. (Inspired
by an image in (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016).)
In this paper we are concerned with a variant of anomaly detection typically
referred to as out-of-distribution (OoD) data detection. Figure 1 shows an illus-
trative example of an OoD problem. A model is trained to classify images among
the following classes: {horse, dog, cat, bird, automobile}. The training procedure
involved augmentation, including random rotations. When a new image x is pro-
vided containing any of these entities, the model should be able to predict the
result and assign a probability to each prediction. In the case of Figure 1 we
record the classifier’s response yˆ = fW (x) while rotating an image belonging to
the class dog in the range of 0o ≤ θ ≤ 180o degrees. From Figure 1 it is evident
that the classifier is able to predict the true label y, which in this instance is
dog, with approximately 100% confidence for angles up to θ ≤ 30o degrees, while
it fails to predict the correct label for any rotation angle θ > 30o. Moreover, in
the cases where the model misclassifies the rotated image, it can assign a very
high confidence to the incorrect class membership. For example at θ = 40o and
θ = 80o the model classifies the rotated image to be a cat and an automobile
respectively with very high confidence.
This uncovers two related issues. First, the example demonstrates the inca-
pability of the model to detect OoD samples previously unseen by it. Second,
the classifier misclassifies predictions with high confidence. For instance, the im-
age of the dog was classified as a cat or an automobile (i.e. black and orange
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curves in Figure 1) with high confidence across different rotation angles. This
can potentially lead to problems related with trustworthiness, transparency and
privacy of the prediction (Schulam and Saria, 2019). This phenomenon is not
new (Szegedy et al., 2013), and since being identified has captivated significant
research effort to understand its underpinnings and provide related solutions.
Many of the proposed solutions have their roots in different fields such as dif-
ferential privacy, information theory, robust high dimensional statistics, robust
control theory and robust optimisation. Recently attention has been concen-
trated to methods that provide a principled approach to quantifying uncertainty
through Bayesian deep learning (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016; Maddox et al.,
2019; Malinin and Gales, 2018; Grathwohl et al., 2019). In spite of their so-
phistication, questions remain unanswered regarding the effectiveness of these
approaches.
As well as the OoD prediction problem, there is another issue with which
deep neural networks struggle: adversarial noise (Akhtar and Mian, 2018; Ozdag,
2018). For a trained deep neural network model, adversarial noise can be added
to an input image in a way such that the model classifies the image with added
adversarial noise to a different class different from its actual. If this noise is
chosen carefully the image can appear unchanged to a human observer. As more
and more deep learning based image recognition systems are being deployed in
real life, such adversarial attacks can result in serious consequences. Therefore
developing strategies to mitigate against them is an important research field.
In this paper we describe an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of
Bayesian deep learning for OoD detection, by performing an evaluation on a
number of different methods using a selection of image classification datasets.
This experiment benchmarks the performance of current state-of-the-art meth-
ods, and is aligned in principle to the inquisitive nature of Goldblum et al. (2020).
Examining why such powerful models exhibit properties of miscalibration and an
incapacity to detect OoD samples will allow us to better understand the major
implications in critical domain applications since it implies that their predictions
cannot be trusted (Hill, 2019; Kumar et al., 2019; Alemi et al., 2018; Guo et al.,
2017; Marin et al., 2012). Furthermore, we provide discussions into what we con-
sider to be critical components attributing to this phenomenon which suggest
directions for future work, inspired by evidence in recent literature. Next, we
investigate if there is a benefit of using adversarial noise defence mechanisms for
OoD problem in a Bayesian neural networks which, as far as the authors are
aware, has not been performed previously. Finally, we investigate the in-sample
adversarial noise robustness of a Bayesian neural network.
The main contributions of this work are:
– A benchmark study that empirically demonstrates that some Bayesian deep
learning methods do indeed outperform simpler networks in OoD detection.
– A demonstration from the benchmark that out of those approaches consid-
ered, Stochastic Weight Averaging of Gaussian Samples (SWAG) (Maddox
et al., 2019) is most effective (it achieves the best balance between perfor-
mance in the OoD detection task and the original image classification task).
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– We empirically show that OoD detection is harder when even minimal over-
lap between in-distribution and out-of-distribution examples exists.
– Our experiments show that outlier exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2019) might
not be beneficial when there exists between in-distribution and out-of-distribution
examples.
– We demonstrate the adversarial noise robustness of Bayesian neural network
models.
– Investigating the effect of adversarial noise defence methods on Bayesian
neural network algorithms.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes related work; Section
3 describes an experiment to benchmark the ability of Bayesian neural networks
to detect OoD examples; Section 4 investigates the effects of adversarial noise
defence mechanisms on classification models and the ability of Bayesian neu-
ral networks with and without these defences to identify adversarial examples;
finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
The goal of anomaly detection (Chalapathy and Chawla, 2019), is to detect
any inputs that do not conform to in-distribution data—referred as out-of-
distribution data (OoD). While there are approaches that are solely targeted at
the detection of anomalies (for example (Chalapathy and Chawla, 2019; Erfani
et al., 2016; Marchi et al., 2015)), classification models that can identify anoma-
lous inputs as part of the classification process are attractive. For instance, it is
desirable that a model trained for image classification (such as that described
in Figure 1) would be capable of not only classifying input images accurately,
but would also be capable of identifying an input image that does not belong
to any of the classes that it is trained to recognise. Not only can this be useful
for detecting ambiguous inputs (Schulam and Saria, 2019), but it can also be
useful for detecting more insidious adversarial examples (Carlini and Wagner,
2017). This type of outlier detection as part of the classification process is most
commonly referred to as OoD detection.
The majority of OoD detection approaches utilise the uncertainty of classifier
outputs as an indicator that an input instance is OoD. Such methods are mostly
based on density estimation techniques utilising generative models or ensembles.
For example, Choi et al. (2018) presented an ensemble of generative models for
density-based OoD detection by estimating epistemic uncertainty of the likeli-
hood, while Hendrycks and Gimpel (2017) focused on detecting malformed in-
puts, x, from their conditional distribution p(y|x), assigning OoD inputs lower
confidence than normal inputs. Hybrid models for uncertainty quantification are
also common. For example, the work of Zhu and Laptev (2017) that describes
an end-to-end system using recurrent networks and probabilistic models. The
overall architecture is composed of an encoder-decoder recurrent model coupled
with a multilayer perceptron (MLP) on top of the encoder allowing to estimate
the uncertainty of predictions.
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The recent resurgence of interest in the combination of Bayesian methods
with deep neural networks (see (Wang and Yeung, 2016)) has given rise to ap-
proaches training classification models that output local likelihood estimates of
class membership, providing better estimates of classification uncertainty than
those trained using standard deep neural network (DNN) approaches producing
point-estimates. Models with outputs that better represent classification uncer-
tainty can be directly applied to the OoD detection problem—intuitively predic-
tions with low certainties or cases where multiple classes have similar certainty
suggest OoD examples—and recent approaches that use a Bayesian formulation
have claimed to be effective at this. One early example is MC-Dropout (Gal and
Ghahramani, 2016) which views the use of dropout at test time as approximate
Bayesian inference. Monte Carlo sampling from the model at test time for differ-
ent subsets of the weights is used to achieve this. MC-Dropout is based on prior
work (Damianou and Lawrence, 2013) which established a relationship between
neural networks with dropout and Gaussian Processes (GP). Stochastic Weight
Averaging of Gaussian Samples (SWAG) (Maddox et al., 2019), an extension of
stochastic weight averaging (SWA) (Izmailov et al., 2018), is another important
example of an approximate Bayesian approach that has been shown to be use-
ful for OoD detection. In SWAG, the weights of a neural network are averaged
during different SGD iterations (Mandt et al., 2017) which allows approximates
of output distributions to be calculated.
The Dirichlet Prior Network (DPN) (Malinin and Gales, 2018) is a more
recent approach with a specific focus on detecting OoD instances. While other
approaches using Bayesian ideas aim at constructing an implicit conditional
distribution with certain desirable properties—e.g., appropriate choice of prior
and inference mechanism—DPN strives to explicitly parameterise a distribution
using an arithmetic mixture of Dirichlet distributions. DPN also introduces a
separate source of uncertainty through an OoD dataset used at training time
(i.e. similar to outlier exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2019)). Training a DPN model
involves optimising the weights of a neural network by minimising the Kullback-
Leibler Divergence between in-distribution and out-of-distribution data, where
in-distribution data has been modelled with a sharp prior Dirichlet distribution
while out-of-distribution data is modelled with a flat prior Dirichlet distribution.
The Joint Energy Model (JEM) (Grathwohl et al., 2019) is an alternative
approach that uses generative models to improve the calibration of a discrimina-
tive model by reinterpreting an existing neural network architecture as an Energy
Based Model (EBM). Specifically they use an EBM (LeCun et al., 2006), which
is a type of generative model that parameterises a probability density function
using an unnormalised log-density function. It was also shown in (Grathwohl
et al., 2019) that JEM is effective on OoD problems.
All of these methods perform OoD detection by converting their class mem-
bership outputs into a score indicating the likelihood of an out-of-distribution
input instance and then applying a threshold to this score. There are four com-
mon approaches to calculating these scores:
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– Max probability : This is the maximum value of the softmax outputs. If yˆ =
[y1, y3, . . . , yk] is the prediction, then maxk p(yk|x) is used as the score.
– Entropy : Calculates information entropy H(Y ) = −∑Kk=1 p(yˆk) log p(yˆk)
over the class memberships predicted by a model (Malinin and Gales, 2018).
– Mutual Information: Ep(x,y)[ p(x,y)p(x)p(y) ] measures the amount of information
obtained about a random variable X by observing some other random vari-
able Y (Tschannen et al., 2019). Here X could describe the entropy of the
predictions and Y the entropy of a Dirichlet mixture encompassing the final
predictions.
– Differential Entropy : Also known as the continuous entropy is defined as
follows h(Y ) = − ∫ p(yˆ) log p(yˆ)dx. This is used to measure distributional
uncertainty between in-out distributions.
These techniques can also be applied to the outputs of a simple deep neural
network to perform OoD detection in the same manner.
Despite the resurgence of Bayesian methods for deep learning, there are still
a number of challenges that need to be addressed before fully harnessing their
benefits for OoD detection. Foong et al. (2019) draws attention to the poorly un-
derstood approximations due to computational tractability upon which Bayesian
neural networks rely, indicating that common approximations such as factorised
Gaussian assumption and MC-Dropout lead to pathological estimates of predic-
tive uncertainty. Posteriors obtained via mean field variation inference (MFVI)
(Blei et al., 2017) are unable to represent uncertainty between data clusters but
have no issue representing uncertainty outside the data clusters. Similarly, MC-
Dropout cannot represent uncertainty in-between data clusters, being more con-
fident in the midpoint of the clusters rather than the centres. In addition, Wen-
zel et al. (2020) questioned the efficacy of accurate posterior approximation in
Bayesian deep learning, demonstrating through MCMC sampling that the pre-
dictions induced by a Bayes posterior systematically produced worse results than
point estimates obtained from SGD.
Bias in models has been also observed due to the extreme overparameterised
regime of neural networks. Predictions in the vicinity of the training samples
are regularised by the continuity of smoothness constraints, while predictions
away from the training samples determine the generalisation performance. The
different behaviours reflect the inductive bias of the model and training algo-
rithm. Zhang et al. (2020) showed that shallow networks learn to generalise but
as their size increases they are more biased into memorising training samples.
Increasing the receptive field of convolutional networks introduces bias towards
memorising samples, while increasing the width and number of channels does not.
This seems to be in accordance with equivalent findings from Azulay and Weiss
(2019) identifying that subsampling operations in combination with nonlineari-
ties introduce a bias, producing representations that are not shiftable therefore
causing the network to lose its invariance properties. Finally, Fetaya et al. (2020)
showed that conditional generative models have the tendency to assign higher
likelihood to interpolated images due to the class-unrelated entropy indicating
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that likelihood-based density estimation and robust classification might be at
odds with each other.
Prior work has focused on investigating the sensitivity of point estimate
DNNs for OoD detection on corrupted inputs as well as comparing local vs
global methods (i.e. ensembles) (Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2016; Chen et al., 2020;
Hendrycks and Dietterich, 2019; Hendrycks et al., 2018b). In this work, however,
we focus on investigating the effectiveness of local likelihood methods when in-
puts are not considered corrupted by noise or an adversary. In spite of the re-
cent emergence of multiple approaches to the OoD detection problem based on
Bayesian methods, and the uncertainty surrounding their effectiveness, no ob-
jective benchmark regarding their relative performance at this task currently
exists in the literature to best of our knowledge. This paper provides such a
benchmark.
To "fool" a deep neural network, examples can be specifically generated in
such a way that a specific image is forced to be assigned to a class, from which
it does not belong. This is done by adding noise such that it looks identical to
the human eye, but it either 1) classifies the example to a specific target class
to which the example does not belong (targetted), or 2) to any class than its
original one (un-targeted). Such induced noise is called adversarial noise, and can
be generated using several methods (Ozdag, 2018; Akhtar and Mian, 2018). As
deep learning based vision systems are being deployed in real life applications,
the field of research to defend the deep model from being robust of adversarial
noise is very important. There are several adversarial noise defence mechanisms
mentioned in the literature (Pang et al., 2020; Xiao et al., 2020; Cohen et al.,
2019). Our work presented in this paper constitutes an extended version of prior
work (Mitros et al., 2020). The current extension of this work corresponds to
the analysis found in Section 4.
3 Experiment 1: Benchmarking OoD Detection
In this experiment, using a number of well-known image classification datasets,
we evaluate the ability of four state-of-the-art methods based on Bayesian deep
learning—DPN, MC-Dropout, SWAG, and JEM—to detect OoD examples, and
compare this with the performance of a standard deep neural network (DNN).
3.1 Experimental Setup
We use a 28 layers wide and 10 layers deep WideResNet (Zagoruyko and Ko-
modakis, 2016) as the DNN model, and this is also the base model used by the
other approaches. When they were available for a specific dataset, we utilised
pre-trained models provided by the original authors of the approach to avoid any
discrepancies in our results with results already presented by those authors. For
instance, (Grathwohl et al., 2019) made available a pre-trained JEM model for
the CIFAR-10 dataset, and we use this in our experiments rather than training
our own. For the remaining models we trained each model for 300 epochs using a
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validation set for hyper-parameter tuning and rolling back to the best network to
avoid overfitting. For all models trained we performed extensive hyper-parameter
tuning starting from recommendations by the original authors where these were
available.
The optimiser used during the experiments was Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) (Goodfellow et al., 2016) with momentum set to 0.9 and weight decay
in the range [3e−4, 5e−4]. Additionally, every dataset was split into three dis-
tinct sets {train, validation, test} with augmentations such as random rotation,
flip, cropping and pixel distortion applied on the training set. The source code
and the pre-trained models for the experiments are available in an online code
repository.1
A significant distinction between DPN and the other approaches used is that
DPN uses an idea similar to outlier exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2019) and, so,
requires two datasets during training: one to represent the in-distribution data
and the other to simulate out-of-distribution data.
Five well-known image classification datasets are used in this experiment:
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009), CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009),
SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011), FashionMNIST (Xiao et al., 2017), and LSUN (Yu
et al., 2015) (We use only the bedroom scene in this experiment and LSUN is
not used to train models, only as OoD data for testing.)
To comprehensively explore the performance of the different models we per-
form experiments using each dataset to train a model and use all other datasets
to measure the ability of the model to perform OoD detection. The ability of
each model to perform the image classification task it was trained for, was first
evaluated using the test set associated with each dataset. All datasets have bal-
anced class distributions, therefore we use classification accuracy to measure this
performance.
To measure the ability of models to recognise OoD examples, we make predic-
tions for the test portion of the dataset used to train the model (in-distribution
data) and then also make predictions for the test portion of three other datasets
(out-of-distribution data): CIFAR-100, SVHN, and LSUN. This means that for
each training set we have three different evaluations of OoD detection effec-
tiveness. For example, when SVHN is used as the in-distribution training set,
CIFAR-10, LSUN, and CIFAR-100 are used as the out-of-distribution test sets.
One of the available out-of-distribution datasets is selected for use at training
time for DPN which requires this extra data. Only the training portions of this
dataset is used for this purpose, while the test portions are used for evaluation.
The predictions provided by the models are converted into OoD scores using
the four alternative approaches described in Section 2: max probability, entropy,
mutual information, and differential entropy. To avoid having to set thresholds
on these scores, for each approach we measure the separation between the scores
generated for instances in the in-distribution and out-of-distribution test sets
1 The source code and pre-trained models will be available at:
https://github.com/anonymity-joggler/bdlood .
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using the area under curve the ROC curves (AUC-ROC) based on the four
different approaches for calculating scores.
3.2 Results & Discussion
Table 1 shows the overall performance of each model for the basic in-distribution
image classification tasks they were trained for, measured using classification
accuracy. These results indicate that, for most cases, the Bayesian methods are
performing comparatively to the DNN baseline (the cases where this is not true
will be discussed shortly).
Table 1: Accuracy of models on in-distribution dataset image classification tasks.
Model CIFAR-10 SVHN FashionMNIST CIFAR100
DNN 95.06 96.67 95.27 77.44
DPN 88.10 90.10 93.20 79.34
MC-Dropout 96.22 96.90 95.40 78.39
SWAG 96.53 97.06 93.80 78.61
JEM 92.83 96.13 83.21 77.86
Table 2 shows the results of the OoD detection experiments. The scores rep-
resent AUC-ROC scores calculated using entropy of the model outputs for OoD
detection. Values inside parenthesis indicate the percentage improvement with
respect to DNN, which is treated as a baseline. The ↑ indicates an improvement
and the ↓ indicates a degradation. The last row of the table shows the aver-
age percentage improvement across the dataset combinations for each approach
with respect to the DNN baseline. Similar tables based on OoD scores calcu-
lated using max probability, mutual information, and differential entropy are
available in supplementary material. Table 3 summarises the results from these
tables and presents the average performance increase with respect to the DNN
baseline based on AUC-ROC calculated using each OoD scoring method.
It is clear from Table 2 that most of the Bayesian methods— DPN, MC-
Dropout and SWAG—almost always improve OoD detection performance over
the DNN baseline. Interestingly, in our experiment JEM consistently performed
poorly with respect to the DNN baseline. We attribute this mostly to a failure
of robust selection of hyper-parameter combinations. Despite our best efforts we
were not able to achieve classification accuracy (above 83%) on the FashionM-
NIST dataset using this approach, and the OoD performance suffered from this.
However, even for the datasets in which the JEM models performed well for
the image classification task (SVHN and CIFAR-100) its use did not lead to an
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Table 2: Out-of-distribution experiment results. Scores are Entropy based AUC-
ROC in percentage. The values in bracket are % improvement of the correspond-
ing algorithm wrt. DNN, taken as a baseline. An ↑ indicates improvement and
↓ degradation wrt. the baseline (DNN). The asterisks (*) next to each dataset
indicates out-distribution datasets used to train DPN.
Data (baseline) Entropy AUC-ROC score (% gain wrt. baseline)
In-distribution OoD DNN DPN MC-Dropout SWAG JEM
CIFAR-10
CIFAR-100* 86.27 85.60 (↓0.78%) 89.92 (↑4.23%) 91.89 (↑6.51%) 87.35 (↑1.25%)
SVHN 89.72 98.90 (↑10.23%) 96.25 (↑7.28%) 98.62 (↑9.92%) 89.22 (↓0.56%)
LSUN 88.83 83.30 (↓6.23%) 92.04 (↑3.61%) 95.12 (↑7.08%) 89.84 (↑1.14%)
SVHN
CIFAR-100 93.19 99.10 (↑6.34%) 94.33 (↑1.22%) 95.97 (↑2.98%) 92.34 (↓0.91%)
CIFAR-10* 94.58 99.60 (↑5.31%) 94.97 (↑0.41%) 96.03 (↑1.53%) 92.85 (↓1.83%)
LSUN 92.97 99.70 (↑7.24%) 93.31 (↑0.37%) 95.71 (↑2.95%) 91.82 (↓1.24%)
FashionMNIST
CIFAR-100 91.20 99.50 (↑9.10%) 93.75 (↑2.80%) 96.19 (↑5.47%) 62.79 (↓31.15%)
CIFAR-10* 94.59 99.60 (↑5.30%) 96.06 (↑1.55%) 94.28 (↓0.33%) 64.76 (↓31.54%)
LSUN 93.34 99.80 (↑6.92%) 97.40 (↑4.35%) 99.05 (↑6.12%) 65.38 (↓29.96%)
CIFAR-100
CIFAR-10 78.25 85.15 (↑8.82%) 80.70 (↑3.13%) 84.92 (↑8.52%) 77.64 (↓0.78%)
SVHN* 81.52 92.64 (↑13.64%) 85.59 (↑4.99%) 94.16 (↑15.51%) 81.22 (↓0.37%)
LSUN 77.22 86.38 (↑11.86%) 76.58 (↓0.83%) 87.22 (↑12.95%) 77.54 (↑0.41%)
Avg % improvement (↑6.48%) (↑2.76%) (↑6.60%) (↓7.96%)
Table 3: Percent performance increase wrt. baseline (DPN) for all the evaluation
score. The values in parenthesis are the relative ranks of improvement for the
corresponding evaluation score. Last row indicates the improvement ranking of
the algorithms, averaged through the evaluation scores.
DPN MC-Dropout SWAG JEM
Max prob. 5.895% (2) 2.618% (3) 6.067% (1) -8.350% (4)
Mutual Info. 7.262% (1) 6.243% (2) 5.337% (3) -8.034% (4)
Entropy 6.480% (2) 6.480% (3) 6.601% (1) -7.960% (4)
Diff. Entropy 9.232% (1) 4.386% (3) 5.495% (2) -10.217% (4)
Avg. rank (1.50) (2.75) (1.75) (4.00)
increase in OoD detection performance 2. Overall we found that both JEM and
DPN can be quite unstable and extremely sensitive to hyper-parameter choice.
The results in Table 3 indicate that among the different evaluation metrics,
DPN performs best for OoD detection, with SWAG following closely behind. MC-
Dropout is third, but comparatively worse than the other two. All three Bayesian
methods on average increase OoD detection performance with respect to the
DNN baseline regardless of the approach used to calculate OoD scores. DPN used
2 Another instance where we were not able to successfully replicate results presented
was in the case of DPN trained with CIFAR-10 for in-distribution, and CIFAR-100
for OoD. After following the same hyper-parameter combinations as in (Malinin and
Gales, 2018) and taking advice kindly provided by (Grathwohl et al., 2019) we found
that the model diverged instead of closely approximating the original results shown
in the paper.
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in combination with differential entropy is especially effective. For other methods
the best performance is achieved using entropy as the score for the OoD detection
task. This indicates that overall, Bayesian methods improve the performance on
OoD detection, with DPN and SWAG achieving similar performance (although
JEM does not achieve improvements over the DNN baseline).
However, it is worth noting from Table 1 that the DPN models do not perform
well on the base image classification tasks compared to the other approaches.
Therefore, we conclude that of the approaches compared in this experiment
SWAG is the most effective as it achieves strong OoD detection performance,
without compromising basic in-distribution classification performance. It also
does not require the use of an OoD datset at training time. Although, if the
objective is achieving the best possible OoD detection performance then DPN
should be considered instead.
It is also worth mentioning that the performance of models used in combina-
tion with the four approaches to calculating OoD scores (described in Section 2),
varies slightly. The max probability, entropy and mutual information approaches
are sensitive to class overlap between in-distribution and out-of-distribution
data, while differential entropy seems to be more sensitive to the target pre-
cision parameter of the Dirichlet distribution, controlling how it is concentrated
over the simplex of possible outputs.
4 Experiment 2: Robustness Analysis
Having identified in the previous experiment that Bayesian neural network mod-
els can be utilised for OoD detection, we proceed by verifying whether they
can withstand un-targeted adversarial attacks. We design a new experiment in-
cluding the usual DNN acting as a control baseline and two Bayesian models
(MC-Dropout and SWAG), in order to answer the following questions:
1. Are Bayesian neural networks capable of detecting adversarial examples?
2. Could simple defence mechanisms {Top-k, Randomised Smoothing, MMLDA},
outperform BNN or improve their overall performance?
4.1 Experimental Setup
First, we evaluated the ability of each model against un-targeted adversarial
examples generated with Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017;
Ozdag, 2018) with the following hyper-parameter values  = 0.1 and α = 0.01 for
ten iterations. Second, we introduced three recently proposed defence techniques
against adversarial examples and evaluated their efficacy on the (i)clean test set,
(ii)adversarially corrupted test set, and finally on the (iii)OoD detection task.
The defence methods evaluated against adversarial examples are: Randomised
Smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019), Sparsify k-winners take all (Top-k) (Xiao et al.,
2020), and Max-Mahalanobis Linear Discriminant Analysis (MMLDA) (Pang
et al., 2020). We use only the CIFAR-10 dataset in these experiments.
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Table 4: Accuracy on CIFAR-10 clean test set for each defence technique. Values
in parenthesis indicate the percentage of abstained predictions.
Model No defence Top-k RandSmooth MMLDA
DNN 95.06 94.52 86.25 (13.00) 95.18
MC-Dropout 96.22 94.43 86.98 (13.39) 95.21
SWAG 96.53 91.73 79.68 (20.32) 91.30
Table 5: Accuracy on CIFAR-10 test set corrupted with adversarial noise.
Model No Defence Top-k RandSmooth MMLDA
DNN 1.15 11.41 62.65 (27.75) 45.71
MC-Dropout 1.94 7.28 88.85 (17.98) 47.90
SWAG 0.55 0.79 36.80 (20.97) 47.95
In order to train models with MMLDA and RandSmooth we utilised the
same number of hyper-parameters and values as they are depicted in the original
papers. For instance, for MMLDA we utilised a variance of value 10 for CIFAR-
10 in order to compute the Max-Mahalanobis centres on z, where z denotes the
features regarding the penultimate layer of each model z = f(x). We should also
notice the possibility for randomised smoothing to achieve better results at the
expense of increased prediction time. A key combination for obtaining successful
results is the number of samples n = 55, or randomised copies for each x in
the test set, together with the confidence level α = 0.001 (i.e. there is a 0.001
probability that the answer will be wrong) and standard deviation σ = 0.56 of
the isotropic Gaussian noise.
4.2 Results & Discussion
We first illustrate the effect of adversarial noise on the ability of different model
types to perform the underlying CIFAR-10 classification task in the presence of
adversarial noise. Table 4 shows the performance of each model type on the basic
CIFAR-10 classification problem on a clean dataset with no adversarial noise.
We see here that, apart from randomise smoothing, the addition of noise de-
fence strategies does not negatively affect performance at this task. Randomised
smoothing had a negative impact on the in-distribution performance across all
methods indicating that robustness might be at odds with accuracy (Tsipras
et al., 2019). MMLDA and Top-k seem to have a positive effect on DNN and
MC-Dropout but not on SWAG.
Table 5 summarises the performance of the same models when adversarial
noise is added to the text examples. The first column in Table 5 corresponds
to the accuracy on the adversarially corrupted test set for each model without
applying any adversarial defence mechanism. Lower values indicate that the ad-
versarial attack was successful and managed to force the model to misclassify
instances with high confidence. When Randomised smoothing is used the val-
ues in parentheses denote the percentage of abstained predictions on the total
Ramifications of A.P.I. for BDL in Adversarial and OoD Settings 13
Table 6: Out-of-distribution detection results for all defence methods on clean vs
adversarially corrupted CIFAR-10. Scores represent entropy based AUC-ROC in
percentage.
Data Entropy AUC-ROC score
In-distribution OoD DNN MC-Dropout SWAG
CIFAR-10/No defence CIFAR-10 Adv. 13.67 36.54 73.81
CIFAR-10/Topk CIFAR-10 Adv. 99.83 99.83 98.90
CIFAR-10/MMLDA CIFAR-10 Adv. 53.15 85.65 70.38
CIFAR-10/RandSmooth CIFAR-10 Adv. 62.68 57.06 48.29
number of instances from the test set. The impact of adversarial noise is clear
from these results. When no defence mechanism is used classification accuracy
plummets to less than 2% for all models. The addition of the defence techniques,
especially MMLDA and random smoothing (albeit taking into account that it
does not provide classifications for many examples), improve this performance.
Table 6, however, shows that model output can be used to identify adversarial
examples in the same way that OoD examples were identified previously be
measuring the entropy of the output layer activations. These tables compare the
entropy scores generated for an in-distribution test set versus those generated
for adversarial examples and uses AUC-ROC scores to measure the ability of
a model to distinguish them. We see first, that in line with the results in the
previous section the Bayesian models perform much better at this task than the
basic DNN when no defence against adversarial examples is used. SWAG, in
particular, is very effective. When the adversarial defence mechanisms are used,
the performance increases dramatically. Top-k in particular is especially effective
here.
Finally, Table 7 shows whether the defence techniques provide any improve-
ments in regard to the OoD detection task. These results are from a repeat of
the experiment described in Section 3 (and detailed in Table 2) in which the
defence techniques are incorporated with the models compared. The values rep-
resent AUC-ROC scores computed based on entropy of the predictions obtained
from each model after having introduced the different defence techniques to each
model. Again the top-k and MMLDA approaches improve performance over the
case when no defence is used.
5 Conclusion
This work investigates if Bayesian methods improve OoD detection for deep
neural networks used in image classification. To do so, we investigated four recent
methods and compared them with a baseline point estimate neural network on
four datasets.
Our findings show that the Bayesian methods overall do indeed improve per-
formance at the OoD detection task over the DNN baseline. Of those examined
DPN performs best, with SWAG following closely behind this. However, DPN
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Table 7: Out-of-distribution detection results. Scores represent entropy based
AUC-ROC in percentage.
Data Entropy AUC-ROC score
In-distribution OoD DNN MC-Dropout SWAG
CIFAR-10/Topk
CIFAR-100 90.59 90.45 84.72
SVHN 91.20 92.62 94.61
LSUN 92.42 92.39 89.81
CIFAR-10/MMLDA
CIFAR-100 99.87 99.24 79.78
SVHN 99.74 99.75 84.56
LSUN 99.93 99.67 81.72
CIFAR-10/RandSmooth
CIFAR-100 62.91 69.33 60.21
SVHN 42.62 63.22 66.48
LSUN 61.94 69.10 61.23
requires additional data during training, is sensitive to hyper-parameter tuning,
and led to poorer in-distribution performance. Therefore, from an overall point of
view, we conclude that SWAG is the most effective of the approaches examined.
Next we demonstrated that, despite being better than simple models, Bayesian
neural networks do not possess the ability to cope with adversarial examples. Al-
though adversarial defence techniques overall degrade accuracy on the clean test
set, at the same time, they robustify against adversarial examples across mod-
els and occasionally improve OoD detection. Randomised smoothing performed
the best, followed by MMLDA. In the case of the OoD detection task it seems
that Top-k slightly improved performance for DNN while MMLDA improved
performance for DNN and MC-Dropout.
The broader scope of our work is not only to identify whether Bayesian
methods could be used for OoD detection and to mitigate against adversarial
examples, but also to understand how much of the proposed methods are affected
by the inductive bias in the choices of the model architecture and objective
functions. For our future work we would like to examine these components and
the role they play in robustifying models against outliers.
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